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REVENUE AND TAXATION IN THE MONTANA
ENi. n T A PR OPOEDL
by P. Bruce Harper
INTRODUCTION
Montana's present Constitution was written in 1889. Since that time
the economic, political and philosophical attitudes of the people of this
state have changed. Great demands are now being made of state gov-
ernments that were not contemplated in 1889. Prices are higher, the
standard of living is higher and citizens want comparable conveniences
that only an organized body of people, i.e., a government, can provide.
Normally a constitution would not, and should not impede a govern-
ment's response to the needs and desires of her people. In 1955 the
report of the President's Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
made the following observation:
Some of the fiscal problems facing state and local governments
today stem from failure of the states to remove constitutional and
statutory limitations that concern their freedom of action. It is
often because of these limitations that state and local governments
turn to the national government for assistance. The states have
restricted themselves in the use of taxing and borrowing powers,
and they have earmarked revenues for specific purposes in ways
that deprive legislatures and executives of budgetary control andfiscal flexibility.1
Montana's Constitution is characteristic of the constitutions about which
the report speaks. The Montana Constitution is long and greatly
detailed. It is ambiguous and difficult of interpretation. The Legis-
lative Council has said that the fiscal provisions are the most complex
sections existing in the Constitution ;2 further, "This complexity is illu-
strated by extensive court cases interpreting the language."3 Many of
the provisions of the Constitution are statutory in nature. The group
of constitutions drafted in the late 19th century reflect the general
distrust of government characteristic of the period in which they were
written.4 Consequently, the document is more concerned "with limiting
government than infusing it with strength to achieve positive goals." 5
In 1967 the Legislative Assembly showed their concern with the failure
of the 1889 Constitution to provide a progressive foundation for our
state government. They noted that: (1) conditions have greatly changed
since the charter was adopted; (2) the length and detail of the Montana
Constitution require frequent amendment to adapt it to modern con-
1LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, A STUDY Or THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION, Study Unit
One (December 1969) citing: U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR TRANSMITTAL TO THE CONGRESS (Washington, D.C.,
1955), at 42.
2 MONTANA LEGISLATIVE COUNcIL, THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION, REPORT TO THE FORTY-
FIRST LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, Report No. 25 (1968) at 57.81d.
'LEAGuE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MONTANA, A STUDY Or THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION,
Study Unit Two, (January, 1970) at 3.
5Id.
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ditions; and (3) population, industrial growth and resource develop-
ment create problems that are difficult to resolve under the present
constitution.6
The objective in revising a constitution is better government. The
charter should be a platform or framework within which laws may be
soundly drafted and enacted to meet changing conditions. It has now
been decided to have a constitutional convention. The rewriting of any
article should be governed primarily by the historical experience and
the current and prospective needs of the state.
7
The purpose and goal of this comment is to analyze some sections
of the present constitution in the light of judicial decisions construing
them. Without a careful review of the court cases, many of the provisions
of Article XII, Revenue and Taxation, are not readily understandable.8
Other sections will be briefly discussed. Once one is aware of the vagar-
ies of the present article, he will be in better position to suggest changes
which will fit the needs and goals of the people of Montana.
This comment is directed only to Article XII. It does not consider
Article XIII Public Indebtedness. Whether or not this writer's proposal
would require additional sections concerning public indebtedness must
be left to others who have analyzed Article XIII and understood its
purpose.
EQUALITY AND UNIFORMITY
THE EQUALITY AND UNIFORMITY CLAUSE
Article XII, Section 1: The necessary revenue for the support and
maintenance of the state shall be provided by the legislative assem-
bly, which shall levy a uniform rate of assessment and taxation,
and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation
for taxation of all property, except that specially provided for in
this article. The legislative assembly may also impose a license
tax, both upon persons and upon corporations doing business in
this state.
At first blush, Section 1 of the Revenue and Taxation article
appears to be a grant of power by the citizens of the state to the
Legislature. However, a state legislature does not act under enumerated
powers'0 but, rather, under inherent power. A state constitution works
to restrict the power of the legislature." State constitutions are dis-
tinguishable from the United States Constitution in this manner:
. . . The government of the United States is one of enumerated
powers; the national constitution being the instrument which speci-
fies them, and in which authority should be found for the exercise
OLEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MONTANA, A STUDY OF THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION,
Study Unit One, (December, 1969) at 1.
7BROOKE, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REvIsION CHAPTER 14 TAXATION AND FINANCE (1960
Public Administration Service) at 236.
8Montana Legislative Council, supra note 2 at 57.
9MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
"'State ez rel Sam Toi v. French, 17 Mont. 54, 56, 41 P. 1078 (1895).
"id.
1971]
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of any power which the national government assumes to possess.
In this respect it differs from the constitutions of the different
states, which are not grants of power to the states, but which
apportion and impose restrictions upon the powers which the states
inherently possess. (Cooley on Const. Lim. p. 10) . . .'
It follows that since the state constitution is not a grant of power,
it does not create the tax power which the legislature is to exercise.
If Article XII were eliminated from the Constitution, the legislature
could do everything it can now, and more as well.'3 It has been held,
therefore, that the two methods of taxation provided for in Section
One are not exclusive. 14 The legislature may adopt other methods of tax-
ation so long as they are not prohibited by some other section of the
state constitution, or the federal constitution,15 and are not in excess
of necessity.'"
What then is the effect of Section 1 of Article XII? The first
sentence requires the legislature to assess and tax property in a man-
ner that is "uniform" and to insure that all property has a "just valua-
tion." Assessment is the process by which persons subject to taxation
are listed, their property described, and its value ascertained. 7 Tax-
ation consists of determining the rate of the levy and imposing it.'
Taxes are levied upon persons and not upon property. 9 However,
the property is used to determine the amount of tax an individual must
pay and, in addition, is also the security for its payment. 20 Of course,
the power to tax is limited to subjects within the jurisdiction of the
state.
2
'
The equality and uniformity provision is not an absolute :22
. . . It is a matter of common experience that absolute equality in
the imposition of a tax is not attainable. Nor is this the meaning
of the constitutional provision. All that it requires is an aim and an
intention on the part of the legislature, in framing the tax law, to
approximate to the ideal of absolute equality as closely as the nature
of the subject and the necessities of practical administration will
permit. . ..
It has been stated that absolute uniformity of taxation upon all classes
of property works a hardship upon some classes of property.24 The old
rule, called the "uniform ad valorem system" was discussed and rejected
in Hilger v. Moore.25 The rule simply stated is that "if A and B each
121d.
"Hilger v. Moore, 56 Mont. 146, 167, 182 P. 477 (1919).
"State v. Driscoll, 101 Mont. 348, 54 P.2d 571 (1936).
BId.
"Rogge v. Petroleum County, 107 Mont. 36, 39, 80 P.2d 380 (1938).
"'State v. Moody, 71 Mont. 473, 482, 230 P. 575 (1924).
"State v. Camp Sing, 18 Mont. 128, 149, 44 P. 516 (1896).
"Id.
"Hayes v. Smith, 58 Mont. 306, 312, 192 P. 613 (1920).
"Anaconda Copper Mining Co. v. Junod, 71 Mont. 132, 140, 227 P. 1001 (1924).
"Id.
"Hilger v. Moore, supra note 13 at 149.
mid.
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owned taxable property of the same value within the same taxing dis-
trict, each should pay thereon precisely the same amount of tax, without
reference to the character of the property. '2 6 But Hilger v. Moore decreed
that the Constitution must be read in its entirety and that division
into chapters and sections was for convenience of reference.2 7 Since
Section 11 of Article XII indicates classification of property is permis-
sible and no other provision prohibits classification, the legislature was
found to have the power to classify property for purposes of taxation.
28
It appeared to the court that Section 1 was borrowed from one Con-
stitution and Section 11 from another.29 The court stated: "The two
provisions are not altogether harmonious, and the construction of them
intended by the framers, is not very clear."3 0 The court held that the
uniform ad valorem rule never prevailed in Montana. Therefore, the
uniformity requirement simply means that taxes must be the same or
nearly so upon the same class of subjects.
The doctrine of classification seeks to "shift the burden of taxation
from property, as such, to productivity, or in other words, to impose
the burdens of government upon property in proportion to its use, its
productivity, its utility, its general setting in the economic organization
of society, so that everyone will be called upon to contribute according
to his ability to bear the burdens .... ,,31 Proper classification of
property for taxing purposes will have real differences between the
subjects constituting the different classes.32 There is no violation of
the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment so long as there
is a real and substantial distinction between classes.38
The uniformity provision has no application where the Constitution
itself fixes value at which property shall be taxed.34 In order for this
provision to apply, one must find the subject of the tax to be property 5
and must also find that the levy imposed is indeed a tax, and not a
license fee.36
In State ex rel Sam Toi v. French the contention was that the legis-
lation providing for laundry licenses was unequal and not uniform. 7
The licenses were divided into three classes: steam laundry $15, one male
laundryman $10, and male laundryman employing one or more other
persons $25. The court held that there was no limitation in the Con-
"Id.
rId.
Ild.
"Id. at 177.
wld.
cId. at 173.
"Hayes v. Smith, supra note 21.
5Hilger v. Moore, supra note 13 at 175.
S'State v. Moody, supra note 17 at 484.
wO'Connell v. State Board of Equalization, 95 Mont. 91, 113, 25 P.2d 114 (1933) and
Mills v. State Board of Equalization, 97 Mont. 13, 19, 33 P.2d 563 (1934).
NState v. French, supra note 10 at 57.
vId.
1971]
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stitution upon the legislature's power regarding trade or occupation
licenses.
We are of the opinion that the first sentence of Section 1, Article
XII, and the whole of Section 11, Article XII, are upon the same
subject, must be read together, and that they refer to taxation,
and the equality and uniformity thereof, and that the last sentence
of Section 1, Article XII, upon licenses, does not fall within the
uniformity provision.'
The general subject of licenses was purposely left for the legislature.3 9
In 1933 the equality and uniformity clause was used to support an
attack made upon the income tax statute.40 As has already been seen,
if the income tax were determined to be an excise tax, i.e., a license,
the clause would have no bearing. But if income were held to be proper-
ty, the statute imposing graduated and progressive income tax would
violate the uniformity requirement and, therefore, be invalid. The court
struggled at great length but found it unnecessary to declare the exact
nature of the income tax. It decided that income tax, whatever it is,
is not a tax on property.41 Therefore, the uniformity requirement of
Section 1 of Article XII does not apply to income taxes either. 42
The problem of whether income was property or not was recognized
by the Legislature when it passed the income tax statute in 1933. The
Legislature urged that an amendment known as the income tax amend-
ment, presently Section la of Article XII, be ratified.
Article XII, Section la: The legislative assembly may levy and
collect taxes upon incomes of persons, firms and corporations for
the purpose of replacing property taxes. These income taxes may
be graduated and progressive and shall be distributed to the public
schools and to the state government.' s
If Section la had been ratified before the tax statute was enacted,
the question of whether or not income was property need not have
been judicially determined since Section la provides for a graduated
and progressive income tax. However, this section did create another
question by its clause "for the purpose of replacing property taxes."
The court held that the section did not impose an affirmative duty on the
legislature to replace property taxes entirely.44 "Had the people meant
that the Legislature should replace property taxes completely on the
advent of an income tax, they would have stated their injunction in
the form of 'must' or 'shall' or 'no' as other constitutional proscriptions
are worded. '45 The court further held, contrary to the defendants
RId. at 60.
8Montana Milk Control Board v. Maier, 140 Mont. 38, 367 P.2d 305 (1962).
'
0O 'Connell v. State Board, supra note 35.
"Id. at 113, quoting from Brown, THE NATURE OF INcOME TAX, 17 MINN. L. REV. 127
(1933) at 145: "The fundamental nature of the income tax is in short that it is an
income tax and nothing else."
120 'Connell v. State Board, supra note 35 at 114. Affirmed: Mills v. State, supra Note
State v. Toomey, 135 Mont. 35, 335 P.2d 1051 (1959).
'
8 MONT. CONST. art. XII, § IA.
"State v. Toomey, supra note 42 at 45.
451d.
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contention in State v. Toomey, that simply because the people had con-
fined the income tax to persons, firms, and corporations did not mean
that the tax had to be imposed on them simultaneously.
46
THE CLASSIFICATION CLAUSE
Article XII, Section 11: Taxes shall be levied and collected by
general laws and for public purposes only. They shall be uniform
upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the
authority levying the tax. 7
The equality and uniformity provisions of the Montana Revenue
and Taxation Article cannot be adequately explained or understood
without analyzing Section 11 of the Article. As has already been seen,
Hilger v. Moore48 determined that Montana would not follow the uniform
ad valorem system but would instead adopt the classification system.
What does it mean to say that there must be a real difference between
the subjects constituting the different classes? The judiciary has stated
that classification of subjects for taxation "must be based upon sub-
stantial distinctions which makes one class readily different from an-
other. '49 A classification which would make precisely the same kind
of property assessable at one rate if owned by a farmer and at another
and higher rate if owned by a corporation would be arbitrary. The
court also said that "in order to group all taxable property in seven
classes, the terms employed must be subject to broad and generous
construction." 50
In 1920 an attack was made on a statute51 which required that all
livestock brought into this state by any person for the purpose of being
grazed for any length of time shall be taxed for the year in which they
entered the state.52 On other property the annual assessment was usually
made as of a certain date, such as March 1. If property did not come
within the jurisdiction of the state prior to March 1 it was not taxable
until the following year. The court held that the Legislature could not
distinguish between a flock of sheep brought into the state after the
first Monday in March for the purpose of grazing for any period and a
flock of the same size and value brought into the state at the same time
for the purpose of being fed in pens for the same length of time.53 Such
a classification was arbitrary and unjust.
The classification section has worked to restrict the power of the
Legislature in providing assistance to large segments of the population.
In 1933 a statute5 4 was passed which would provide assistance to farm
,Id.
'TMONT. CONST. art. XII, § 11.
"Hilger v. Moore, supra note 13.
"Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Sanders Co., 66 Mont. 608, 615-16, 214 P. 596 (1923).
'Id. at 613.
"REvisED CODES OF MONTANA § 2531 (1907) (Rep. Ch. 109, L. 1921).
"Hayes v. Smith, supra note 21.
"Id. at 314.
"Chapter 41, Section 1, Laws of 1933.
1971)
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and other land owners who had lost their lands due to delinquent
taxes. The world-wide economic crisis precluded the owner from selling
even a portion of the land in order to pay taxes on the balance. Since
taxes continued at the same level, but land values dropped, the whole
property was being taken to be sold. The Legislature proposed that
the penalty for delinquent taxes be suspended as to the prior owners of
the property. The effect of the proposal was to class all prior owners
in a group and waive the penalty as to the group. The court held that
the statute was in violation of Section 11 of Article XII of the Constitu-
tion.55 "Discrimination between taxpayers upon whom taxes have been
levied and assessed upon the same class of subjects cannot be permitted,
for that necessarily implies inequality and injustice."' 6 The court went
on to say:
. . .Whether the policy of favoring some taxpayers of the same
class over others is wise or unwise, the emergent conditions con-
sidered, is not for us to decide, nor was it a subject upon which
the Legislature had a right to legislate, for the expression of the
supreme will of the people-the Constitution--decides the policy
for us all. It must be remembered that the provisions of the Con-
stitution are mandatory and prohibitory unless otherwise expressed,
and these provisions read the same whether in fair weather or in
foul. The proposition that an emergency justifies a removal of con-
stitutional safeguards is an egregious fallacy. A safeguard once let
down inevitably must lead to mischief. If one be let down, why not
another? 'And many an error, by the same example, will rush into
the state.' . ..
The mere fact that property has been classified does not preclude
its being further classified. The moneyed capital and shares of stock
of a bank are taxable at a different and higher rate than are moneys
and credits in the hands of an ordinary individual or corporation. 5
The moneyed capital of a bank is its stock in trade. The use to which
property is devoted and its productivity are the measuring sticks for
classification." There is a substantial difference in the use and produc-
tivity of moneys in the hands of a bank and the moneys in the hands
of an individual sufficient to sustain the foundation for such classifica-
tion.6o
Another example of the Constitution permitting two identical articles
of personal property to be taxed differently in the hands of different
owners is evidenced by Wheir v. Dye.61 The motor vehicles in the hands
of dealers were being taxed at a rate different from those in the hands
of individuals and corporations. All vehicles were to be taxed as of noon
January 1 whereas other personal property was being taxed as of
March 1. The court held that since the whole class was to be taxed on the
EState ex rel Fain v. Fisehl, 94 Mont. 92, 98, 20 P.2d 1057 (1933).
Zeld.
RId. at 98 and 99.
mBank of Miles City v. Custer County, 93 Mont. 291, 297, 19 P.2d 885 (1933).
Hilger v. Moore, supra note 13.
GBank of Miles City, supra note 58 at 298.
"105 Mont. 347, 73 P.2d 209 (1937).
[Vol. 33
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same day no discrimination in violation of Section 11 resulted.6 2 The
court stated that the ease with which motor vehicles could be removed
from the state was alone sufficient reason for special treatment, i.e.,
classification by the Legislature.03 The fact that dealers and individuals
stand in completely different relationship to the property involved was
held to be a sufficient justification for the difference in tax rate.6 4
The car in the hands of the dealer yields profit, while in the hands of an
individual or corporation it is not normally expected to do so. 65
Another limiting effect Section 11 has rendered is illustrated by
Victor Chemical Works v. Silver Bow County.6 6 The statute67 in question
provided for the classification of all taxable property. Property in
Class Four was to be assessed at 30% of its full and true value; property
in Class Five (d) would be assessed at 7% of its full and true value.68
Property in Class Four was described as "land, town and city lots, with
improvement, manufacturing and mining machinery, fixtures and sup-
plies, except as otherwise provided by the constitution of Montana, and
except as such property may be included in Class Five."6 9 Property in
Class Five (d) consisted of "Industrial property included in Class Four,
for a period of three years after such property is first assessed .... ,,70
The court declared that the Legislature had the power to "consider the
use of industrial property and its productivity, and consistent with its
appraisal of these factors may classify industrial property for taxation
as such."'71 However, the court found that this classification had no re-
lation to the productivity or the use of the property reclassified so as to
come within the rule first set forth in Hilger v. Moore.7 2 The amendment
to the statute would set the industrial plant owned by Victor Chemical
Works apart from other property of the same species and thereby dis-
criminate "in favor of one as against another of the same class. s73 It
would tax the plaintiff's property at 7% while others would be taxed at
30%. 74 "The plain mandate of our Constitution as we read sections 1 and
11, Article XII, is thwarted, if we give effect to any such attempted
classification." 75
The significant question generated by the Victor Chemical decision
was: does the Constitution, as interpreted in Victor, prohibit the legis-
lature from granting tax exemption status at a reduced percentage of
6'Id. at 356.
"Wheir v. Dye, supra note 61 at 355.
"Id.
m130 Mont. 308, 301 P.2d 720 (1956).
67Revised Codes of Montana § 84-301 (1947) (as amended chap. 178, Laws of 1951)
[hereinafter R.C.M. 1947].
-R.C.M. 1947 § 84-301.
R.C.M. 1947 § 84-301.
-R.C.M. 1947 § 84-301.
nVictor Chemical Works, supra note 66 at 318.
"Id. at 320.
13Id. at 321.
74Id.
5Id.
1971]
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assessment for a limited period of time to lure new industries into the
state ?76 Justice Angstman concurring and dissenting in Victor stated
that he did not think such to be the thrust of the Constitution at all.77
The Legislature has since passed a statute which provides for separate
classification of new industrial property. 78 One case has recognized this
favorable classification for new industry but noted that the constitution-
ality of the statute was not being questioned. 79
In 1960 it was held that the uniformity requirement was not violated
when the State Board of Equalization, in carrying out its duties of
adjusting and equalizing taxation between oil pipe lines and other
properties, recognized pipelines as a class by themselves.80 Since that
power is granted to the Board by the Constitution,8 ' a legislative enact-
ment, i.e., the classification statute, may not limit that power.8 2 The
class to which the plaintiff maintained it belonged was established by
the Legislature as Class Four.8 3 The Board had placed the oil pipe lines
in Class Seven which was "all property not included in the six preceding
classes."81 4 The court held that so long as the properties of the two
pipelines which are similar in nature and productivity are similarily
treated, the constitutional mandate is observed. 5
The last case to be discussed in connection with the classification
section involves reclassification of property. In Mohland v. State Board
of Equalization,6 the claim that reclassification of farm land as suburban
was violative of Section 11 was not adequately formed. It can be seen
from the case, however, that it is within the power of the Board to clas-
sify property in view of other factors. Hilger v" Moore 7 used very broad
language in holding that classification of property was permissible.
It is not only the economic use to which property is put, or its produc-
tivity, that decides its classification. It is also the property's "utility
and its general setting in the economic organization of society. 88
78HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 51 (1969) "The line between proper elas-
sification under a constitutional provision permitting classification and unwarranted
exemption is often difficult to draw. . . .Would such a decision [Victor Chemical]
prevent the legislature from granting tax exemption of a reduced percentage of
assessment for an initial 5 or 10 year period in order to lure new industries into the
state I ''
77Victor Chemical Works, supra note 66 at 322.
R.C.M. 1947, § 84-301 (as amended chap. 239, Laws of 1961).
7"Cherry Lane Farms v. Treasurer, Gallatin County, 153 Mont. 240, 246, 456 P.2d 296
(1969).
O°Yellowstone Pipe Line Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 138 Mont. 603, 626-627,
358 P.2d 55 (1960).
"MONT CONST. art. XII, § 15.
8Yellowstone Pipe Line Co., supra note 80.8 R.C.M. 1947, § 84-301.
"'Id.
85 Yellowstone Pipe Line Co., supra note 80.
"Mohland v. State Board of Equalization, 155 Mont. 49, 55, 466 P.2d 582 (1970).
1"Hilger v. Moore, supra note 13 at 173.
Id.
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RECOMMENDATION
In its recommendations for revisions to the Constitution, the Tax-
ation and Finance Subcommittee of the Montana Constitution Revision
Commission (hereinafter Subcommittee) considered Section 989 of Article
XII in conjunction with Sections 1 and la.90 Simply stated, Section 9
of Article XII limits the rate of taxation on real and personal property.
However, the section has no bearing on the rate of taxation of income.9 1
It is properly considered in conjunction with any changes in Section 1
since it is a limitation similar to limitatons imposed by Section 11.
The Montana Legislative Council concluded in 1968 that Sections 1
and la were adequate but that Section 9 should be partially revised.
92
However, the Subcommittee recommended that the three sections be
deleted and proposed the following as Section 1:
The rates and methods of taxation of personal and corporate income
and of real and personal property and license taxes upon persons
and corporations for both state and local purposes shall be determined
by law."
The Subcommittee then recommended that the present Section 11 be
left in the Constitution as a reasonable limitation on the authority
granted by Section 1. 94 But why limit the inherent power of the Legis-
lature in such a manner? Is classification of property the best answer to
property taxation now, and, if so, will it be the best answer in the future?
What if it should be determined that the uniformity provision pro-
hibits the favorable classification of industrial property to induce new
industry to enter Montana? If the proposal of the Subcommittee is
followed, the State will again be locked into a tax structure dictated
by the Constitution. Should the people of the state be so afraid of the
power of representative government that they will tie the hands of
their representatives before sending them to the legislature? The ad
OMONT CONST. art XII, § 9: The rate of taxation on real and personal property for
state purposes, except as hereinafter provided, shall never exceed two and one-half
mills on each dollar of valuation; and whenever the taxable property of the state shall
amount to six hundred million dollars ($600,000,000.00) the rates shall never exceed
two mills on each dollar of valuation, unless the proposition to increase such rate,
specifying the rate proposed and the time during which the rate shall be levied shall
have been submitted to the people at the general election and shall have received a
majority of all votes cast for and against it as such election; provided, that in addition
to the levy for state purposes above provided for, a special levy in addition may be
made on live stock for the purpose of paying bounties on wild animals and for stock
inspection, protection and indemnity purposes, as may be prescribed by law, and such
levy shall be made and levied annually in amount not exceeding four mills on the
dollar by the state board of equalization, as may be provided by law.
G°Unpublished report of the Taxation and Finance Subcommittee of the Montana Con-
stitution Revision Commission, November 20, 1969.
O1State v. O 'Connell, supra note 35.9 2Montana Legislative Council, supra note 2 at 57, 58 and 59.
The revision suggested for Section 9 was to delete reference to livestock levies and
provide for any such levies by statute.
13Taxation and Finance Subcommittee interim recommendations, supra note 90.
"Id. at 9.
1971]
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valorem system of taxation may at a later date again be considered to
be a more equitable system of taxation.
The Model State Constitution" is silent as to the equality or uni-
formity of any tax that the legislature may impose. Four state con-
stitutions were analyzed by this writer; two imposed uniformity restric-
tions on the legislature. Michigan's Constitution provides for the uniform
ad valorem system, but then permits the Legislature to provide alterna-
tive means so long as every other tax is "uniform upon the class or
classes upon which it operates." 96 In other words, the Michigan Con-
stitution requires the Legislature to follow the uniform ad valorem
rule or provide for the classification system. This same section provides
for assessment and equalization objectives for all property assessments."
The Illinois Constitution requires the legislature to follow the uniform
ad valorem system.9 8 On the other hand, neither Alaska or Hawaii have
any provision relating to the method by which the legislatures are to
raise revenue.99
It has been said that a state constitution should be silent on matters
of finance and allow the legislature and governor complete freedom
so that fiscal policies may be developed to meet current and emerging
problems.10 0 There should certainly be no limit on the rate of taxation
that may be imposed. Neither should there be a provision telling the
legislature what system of taxation must be used without at least
allowing for alternatives. Since the legislature has inherent power to
tax, any provision purporting to give the legislature that power is
redundant. Sections 1, la, 9 and 11 may be deleted from the constitution
and no section need to be proposed to replace them. The governor and
legislature would then have the power, unhampered by constitutional
95MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION, art. VII, Finance.
"MICH CONST. art. IX Finance and Taxation § 3: The legislature shall provide for the
uniform general ad valorem taxation of real and tangible personal property not exempt
by law. The legislature shall provide for the determination of true cash value of such
property; the proportion of true cash value at which such property shall be uniformly
assessed, which shall not, after January 1, 1966, exceed 50 percent; and for a system
of equalization of assessments. The legisuature may provide for alternative means of
taxation of designated real and tangible personal property in lieu of general ad
valorem taxation. Every tax other than the general ad valorem property tax shall
be uniform upon the class or classes on which it operates.
"MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 7.
"ILL. CONST. art IX, Revenue, §1: The General Assembly shall provide such revenue
as may be needful, by levying a tax, by valuation, so that every person and corpora-
tion shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its property - such
value to be ascertained by some person or persons, to be elected or appointed in such
manner as the General Assembly shall direct, and not otherwise: but the General
Assembly shall have power to tax peddlers, auctioneers, brokers, hawkers, merchants,
commission merchants, showmen, jugglers, innkeepers, grocerykeepers, liquor-dealers,
toll bridges, ferries, insurance, telegraph and express interests or business, vendors
of patents, and persons or corporations owning or using franchises and privileges,
in such manner as it shall, from time to time, direct by general law, uniform as to
the class upon which it operates.
9ALASKA CONST. art. IX, Finance and Taxation; HAWAII CONST. art VI, Finance and
Taxation.
NOLEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MONTANA, A STUDY OF THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION,
Study Unit Two (January 1970) citing: MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION, (6th ed., rev,
1968), 91.
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dictates, to provide the state with a fiscal policy commensurate with
the needs and desires of the people. A provision that would prohibit
the taxing power from being surrendered or contracted away would be a
valid constitutional dictate.
EXEMPTIONS
There are three sections in the Montana Constitution Article XII
which deal specifically with exemption from taxation. Section 2 both
requires and permits certain legislative action; Sections 6 and 7 are
prohibitory in nature. Section 2 on public and quasi-public property
exemptions has been extensively litigated and as a consequence it has
been judicially determined what property will and what property will
not be exempted. Those sections that prohibit the legislature from
exempting property within a given locality and from exempting any
corporate property have had some court interpretation but are relative-
ly clear as to what legislative action is proscribed.
PUBLIC PROPERTY EXEMPTIONS
Section 2: The property of the United States, the state, counties,
cities, towns, school districts, municipal corporations and public
libraries shall be exempt from taxation; and such other property as
may be used exclusively for the agricultural and horticultural
societies, for educational purposes, places for actual religious wor-
ship, hospitals and places of burial not used or held for private or
corporate profit, institutions of purely public charity and evidences
of debt secured by mortgages of record upon real or personal
property in the state of Montana, may be exempt from taxation.1'
This exemption section provides that all public property wilI be
exempt from taxation but that quasi-public property may be exempted
from taxation.10 2 The legislature may exempt quasi-public property, but
it may not exempt any other kind of property. 103 If the Legislature
wants to provide for taxation of real estate to raise funds, it cannot
tax real estate only and allow other classes of property to be exempted. 0 4
Reading the constitution as a whole results in the conclusion that all
property is to be taxed, if indeed any is taxed, unless it falls within
the category provided by Section 2.
Two questions are presented and must be answered in the affirma-
tive before property may obtain exempt status. First, is it a tax that is
being imposed; and second, does the property fit into the categories
provided by the Constitution. The first question no longer presents great
difficulties. All license taxes, real property taxes and personal property
taxes are taxes within the meaning of Section 2. Special assessments
have been held to be taxes and, therefore, not assessable against property
falling into Section 2.105 However, assessments against public property
MMoNT. CONST. art. XII, § 2.
'Cruse v. Fischl, 55 Mont. 258, 262, 175 P. 878 (1918).
"1Id. at 263.
1'0 Stoner v: Timmons, 59 Mont. 158, 196 P. 519 (1920).
"Ford v. Great Falls, 46 Mont. 292, 308, 127 P. 1004 (1912).
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within an irrigation district can be made regardless of the provision
since no part of the revenue derived from the assessment goes to fill
the state coffers or is used for government purposes. 0 6
The second question is more difficult to resolve and has been re-
viewed by the Court on many occasions. Thus, in 1938 such a review was
made of a statute which provided that all property in the possession of
legal guardians of incompetent veterans of World War I, or minor
children of such veterans if such property is funds or derived from
funds received from the United States, shall be exempt from all tax-
ation as property of the United States while held by the guardian. 10 7
The City of Missoula taxed the property of a minor child who met the
statute's qualifications. The argument was made that the statute violated
the Montana Constitution since it exempted property other than public
or quasi-public property. The Montana Court held that the statute was
a valid exercise of the legislative power, and that since title did not pass
from the United States, the property could not be taxed. 08
Another case in which it was determined that the United States
held title to property was Calvin v. Custer County. 0 The United States
and Carl Calvin entered into a contract in which the United States was
to purchase land. The agreement was made firm on June 17, 1938 and
the United States entered into possession and made extensive improve-
ments prior to March 1, 1939. Irregularities in the chain of title were
to be cleared up by Mr. Calvin. The formal deed was delivered to the
United States on November 15, 1939. In an action to recover taxes
assessed as of March 1, 1939, and paid under protest, the court held
that it is the holder of the equitable title and not the legal title which
determines the exemption under our Constitution."10 Since the United
States held equitable title on March 1, 1939, the property was considered
to be public property and protected by the Constitution.
In Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Rosebud County,"' it was
determined that a building owned by the company, leased to the school
district and used for school purposes was exempt from taxation under
Section 2. The Court stated that since the improvement company was
not obtaining any economic advantage from the lease the property
should be tax exempt." 2 The use to which the owner of the building
was applying it could not be taken as the determinative factor, even
though he was obtaining rent. The purpose for the exemption said the
court was to encourage and promote the cause of education." 3 Since
the school was enjoying a benefit, and the property was actually being
IwBuffalo Rapids In. Dist. v. Colleran, 85 Mont. 466, 478-79, 279 P. 369 (1929).
'°R.C.M. 1935, § 1998 (now R.C.M. 1947, § 84-202).
""Henderson v. City of Missoula, 106 Mont. 596, 79 P.2d 547 (1938).
10'111 Mont. 162, 167, 107 P.2d 134 (1940).
nOId.
-'129 Mont. 412, 417, 288 P.2d 657 (1955).
nIud. The property owner was charging rent at a rate that was less than break even.
uid. at 416.
[Vol. 33
13
Harper: Revenue and Taxation in the Montana Constitution
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1972
REVENUE AND TAXATION
used for educational purposes, the tax exemption should be enjoyed by
the owner.
In 1960 a case came before the Montana Court in which the defend-
ant argued that his society was within the religious organization exemp-
tion of Section 2.114 In the alternative he argued that the society was an
agricultural or horticultural organization also within the boundaries
of the tax exemption section. The state was seeking to collect the cor-
poration license taxes for the fourteen years in which the King Colony
had been incorporated. The Articles of Incorporation indicated that
the colony was an International Church Society devoting its entire
membership to farming, stock growing and other branches of horticul-
ture.1 15 The court held that "a nondiscriminating license tax on these
activities does not interfere with the religious freedom or the free exer-
cise of religion." 118 As to the allegation that the society was an agri-
cultural or horticultural organization the court quoted from Mertens
Law of Federal Income Taxation:
Labor, Agricultural or Horticultural Organizations. The exemption
of labor, agricultural and horticultural organizations is by its terms
unconditional, but interpretation has considerably qualified and re-
stricted the exemption. While the statute contains no express re-
quirement prohibiting the inurement of the earnings of such organi-
zation to the benefit of private shareholders or individuals, the
Regulations have provided that requirement and the Regulations
have not been challenged in the courts. The principle (sic) qualifi-
cation for exemption under the Regulations are the following: (1)
the organization must have no net income inuring to the benefit of
any member, (2) it must be educational or instructive in character,
and (3) it must have as its object the betterment of the conditions
of those engaged in labor, agricultural or horticultural pursuits, the
improvements of products and the development of a higher degree
of efficiency in the respective occupations. The fact that Congress
has repeatedly re-enacted the same statutory language with know-
ledge of the well-established administrative interpretation, lends
foundation to an assertion of legislative acquiesence."'
The court also held that the State Board was warranted in relying on
the Federal interpretation of the language since the Legislature adopted
it from the Federal act."" The society was not permitted a tax exemp-
tion since the agricultural pursuits were purely commercial simply being
"the means of acquiring a livelihood for the members of the Colony and
of accumulating money for expansion purposes."" 9
"'State v. King Colony Ranch, 137 Mont. 145, 350 P.2d 841 (1960).
nKId. at 147.
nld. at 150.
uid. at 151, quoting MERTON's LAw or PEDmAT TAxATION § 34.19.
uId.
"'Id. at 149.
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In Flathead Lake Methodist Camp v. Webb 1 20 the plaintiff was a
non-profit corporation, incorporated for the purpose of establishing and
maintaining a Methodist Church Camp on Flathead Lake. Since the
camp was a considerable distance from both Polson and Kalispell there
was need for extensive development. Some of the 22 acres of property
was conceded to be exempt because it was used for religious purposes,
but the question was raised whether the buildings and acreage other
than that specifically used for religion could be exempted.1 21 The
court stated that the test to determine exemption status included edu-
cational and charitable grounds as well as religious grounds. 122 The
education standard is not restricted by traditional concepts: "The end of
the education may be to develop either the mental, physical or moral
qualities.'' 2 If the training is religious education, it is to be measured
as educational and not as religious. 124 The court indicated that the
camp might also have qualified under the public charity concept had
it been necessary to decide the case on that basis. 1 25 The county treas-
urer had argued at great length that exemption statutes were to be
strictly construed and that taxation was the general rule. However,
since there was substantial evidence to support the contention that all
22 acres and 28 improvements were necessary for the accomplishment of
the educational purposes, the court affirmed the finding that the entire
area should be tax exempt. 26 The dissent felt that too much of the
shore line, then valued at about $75 per foot, would take on a tax exempt
status, since the rule laid down by the majority could be complied with
by virtually every church on the Flathead.1
27
What constitutes a charitable organization is illustrated by Bozeman
Deaconess Foundation v. Gallatin County.128 The foundation was a non-
profit corporation without capital stock. At issue was whether Hillcrest
Homes, an elderly and infirm persons' home which required occupancy
fees ranging from $7000 to $32,000 and monthly maintenance charges
of $150 to $250 per month, could qualify as a tax exempt charitable in-
stitution. The court stated that there need not be an exclusive relation
11144 Mont. 565, 567, 399 P.2d 90 (1965). The following is the statement of facts from
which it was determined that the basic use was educational: "The camp caters prin-
cipally to children on an organized, two-week basis. They are segregated by age
throughout the summer, each two-week camp having approximately 150 children in
attendance. The area served is somewhat larger than a circle encompassing western
Montana. The activities range from instruction, praying, meditation, and nature
walks to secular recreation such as archery, swimming, and crafts. Each day is or-
ganized to provide a balanced program of arts and crafts, physical activity, religious
instruction, rest, chores and prayers. The majority of the children are Methodists, but
there is evidence that many different faiths have been represented there over the
years. I I
121id. at 569.
'=Id.
2id.
lu!d.
MId. at 570.
1
"id. at 574.
1"Id. at 575.
10151 Mont. 143, 439 P.2d 915 (1968).
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to poverty stricken people in order to qualify as a charitable corpora-
tion.1 29 Charging fees did not destroy the status either, so long as they
were channelled into the operation of the home, and not to the pockets
of the founders. 130 The property and facilities of Hillcrest were found
to be devoted exclusively to the care of the sick and aged.'8 ' In its
conclusion the court threw open the door to further judicial determina-
tions by stating: "The scope of charity and the standards under which
it is administered are not frozen by the past, but keep pace with the
times and the new conditions and wants of society.'
'1 8 2
One may well ask of what value is a measure in a Constitution that
permits the legislature to exempt certain categories of property when
it is within the inherent power of the legislature to do so. One may also
ask why the Constitution exempts property belonging to the United
States since that property is exempt from taxation unless permission
to tax the same has been given by the federal government. We may then
begin with the proposition that a section permitting the legislature to
exempt property or prohibiting the taxation of United States property
would be empty as well as redundant.
The Model State Constitution has no provision concerning exemption
from taxation.1 3 By failing to provide for exemptions, the authors of
the Model have exhibited their faith in the democratic system of govern-
ment. The state of Hawaii has also shown its faith in the ability of the
people to govern themselves by keeping their Constitution silent as to
what the legislature can do in the area of property tax exemptions.
18 4
The other three constitutions analyzed by this writer each had a
section dealing with property exemptions. The Michigan Constitution
exempts only property owned and occupied by non-profit religious and
educational organizations which is used exclusively for those purposes.
13 5
The Illinois provision permits the legislature to provide for tax exemp-
tion of all property that the Montana Constitution presently either re-
quires or allows to be exempted. 18 6 The Alaska Constitution requires
that all state and local government property be exempted as well as all
'"Id. at 148.
I-Id.
8id. at 149.
=Id.
I-MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION art. VIII.
mHAWAII CONST. art. VI.
=-MICH CONST. art. IX, § 4. Property owned and occupied by non-profit religious or
educational organizations and used exclusively for religious or educational purposes, as
defined by law, shall be exempt from real and personal property taxes.
=ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 3. The property of the State, counties, and other municipal
corporations, both real and personal, and such other property as may be used ex-
clusively for agricultural and horticultural societies, for school, religious, cemetery
and charitable purposes, may be exempted from taxation; but such exemption shall
be only by general law. In the assessment of real estate incumbered by public ease-
ment, any depreciation occasioned by such easement may be deducted in the valuation
of such property.
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religious, charitable, cemetery and educational purpose property.13 7
None of these provisions should be adopted in toto in Montana.
The Montana Legislative Council declared that this section of the
Constitution was adequate. 138 However, the Subcommittee concluded that
this section was statutory in nature and should be replaced with a
provision similar to the one in the New Jersey Constitution. 3 9 That
section provides:
Exemptions from taxation may be granted only by general laws.
Until otherwise provided by law all exemptions from taxation validly
granted and now in existence shall be continued. Exemptions from
taxation may be altered or repealed, except those exempting real
and personal property used exclusively for religious, educational,
charitable or cemetery purposes, as defined by law, and owned by
any corporation or association organized and conducted exclusively
for one or more of such purposes and not operating for profit."
There are a number of reasons why this section is a desirable one.
First, it requires that any exemption law must be a general law. Second,
it distinctly provides for a status quo until the legislature takes action
to change the exemption status of any property. Third, it provides for
the legislature to define the terms religious, educational, charitable, and
cemetery purposes. Fourth, the section restricts the legislature only in
areas that have, historically, been exempt. Furthermore, it is a socially
sound policy to exempt property of this nature. This writer agrees with
the Subcommittee that the New Jersey provision would be a sound
section for an article on taxation and finance.
LOCAL PROPERTY EXEMPTIONS
Section 6: No county, city, town or other municipal corporation,
the inhabitants thereof nor the property therein, shall be released
or discharged from their or its proportionate share of state taxes.'
According to the Subcommittee, this section was included in the
1889 Constitution to deal with a specific situation which existed in
that era.i 2 There may be good reason to exempt certain individuals or
property in a given locality. It would be difficult, however, if not im-
possible, for the legislature to do so. But the section should be deleted
as it works to limit legislative power and discretion.
mALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 4. The real and personal property of the State or its
political subdivisions shall be exempt from taxation under conditions and exemptions
which may be provided by law. All, or any portion of, property used exclusively for
non-profit religious, charitable, cemetery, or educational purposes, as defined by law,
shall be exempt from taxation. Other exemptions of like or different kind may be
granted by general law. All valid existing exemptions shall be retained until other-
wise provided by law.
"'Legislative Council, supra note 2 at 58.
"Subcommittee, supra note 90 at 6.
"N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (2).
"'MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (2).
"'Subcommittee, supra note 90 at 7.
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CORPORATE PROPERTY EXEMPTIONS
Section 7: The power to tax corporations or corporate property shall
never be relinquished or suspended, and all corporations in this
state, or doing business therein, shall be subject to taxation for
state, county, school, municipal and other purposes, on real and
personal property owned or used by them and not by this constitu-
tion exempted from taxation.'
This section is similar to the previous section except that it prohibits
the legislature from suspending any corporate property from taxation.
Just as there may be valid reason for the legislature to suspend taxation
of local property, there may also be reason to suspend the taxation of a
corporation's property. The section has been held to prohibit the exemp-
tion from taxation of certain air and water pollution control equip-
ment.144 It can be argued that it would have been desirable for taxes
to have been suspended for a period of time as an incentive to the
company to make such an investment. The section probably does not
prohibit the legislature from giving industrial property a favorable
classification as an incentive to locate in this state. As was seen in the
Victor Chemical case, however, the legislature must be careful not to
exempt industrial property. 145 In essence, this section, when considered
with Sections 1, 2 and 11 requires the legislature to step carefully in
the area of property classification. But so long as truly favorable classi-
fication of new industrial property is permitted, it simply is not prohib-
iting that which it purports to prohibit. Therefore, it, too, should be
omitted from any proposal for a new taxation article, thereby giving
the legislature complete discretion in this area.
THE REMAINING PROVISIONS
The remaining provisions of Article XII will be discussed in the
order in which they appear in the Constitution. Time and space limita-
tions dictate that only certain of the provisions be set forth and dis-
cussed in detail. The remaining provisions are not as difficult to under-
stand as the ones discussed above, and several have drawn almost
unanimous recommendations for deletion.
"1MONT. CoNsT. art. XII, § 7.
1
"Fickes v. Missoula County, 155 Mont. 258, 470 P.2d 287 (1970). Missoula
County issued revenue bonds to raise money to aid Hoerner Waldorf Corpora-
tion, a paper producer, in reducing air and water pollution. Because of section 7
the corporation could not have been given a tax incentive. The argument was then
made that since it was county funds that purchased the equipment, the county owned
the equipment and it could not, therefore, be subject to tax because of the prohibitions
of section 2. But since the court looked to the use rather than the title of the proper-
ty, and since Hoerner Waldorf was using the property, it was held subject to taxation.
'Victor Chemical, supra note 66.
1971]
18
Montana Law Review, Vol. 33 [1972], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol33/iss1/7
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
Section lb.146 This section is the only earmarking-of-funds section
in the Montana Constitution and was passed in 1956. The measure in-
duces inefficiency by requiring the appropriation of large sums of money
without regard to the needs of the state as a whole, or the needs of the
highways in particular. The Legislative Council has recommended that
the section be deleted,'147 but the Taxation and Finance Subcommittee
thought that it should remain in the new Constitution. 148 If the people
of this state wish to insure that the highways are properly funded, a
legislative enactment similar to this Constitutional provision would
suffice. But this provision should not appear in the Constitution as
fundamental law.
Section 3.149 This section smacks of special interest flavor, under-
standable only when one considers the time the Constitution was written
and the type of economic activity that was then predominate in the
state. An extensive analysis of this section appears in a recent edition
of the Montana Law Review.150 The author of that comment believed
the most damning feature of Section 3 was that it is in the Constitution
at all :151
The measure has a wise legislative purpose, its draftsmanship is
passable; but even if it were perfect, that would be no reason to
immortalize it in the stone of constitutional mandate. . . . Under
Section 3, a- adopted, the legislature has been powerless to clarify
its verbose and litigation-breeding language; powerless to adapt
the purpose of that section to changing developments; and powerless
to modify and correct an ill advised court decision.'"
The Montana Legislative Council 153 and the Subcommittee 154 have both
'"MONT. CONST. art. XII, § lb: No monies paid into the state treasury which are de-
rived from fees, excises or license taxes relating to registration, operation or use of
vehicles on the public highways or to fuels used for the propulsion of such vehicles,
except fees and charges paid to the board of railroad commissioners of the state of
Montana or its successor or successors by motor carriers pursuant to law, shall be ex-
pended for other than cost of administering laws under which such monies are derived,
statutory refunds and adjustments provided therein, payment of highway obligations,
cost of construction, reconstruction, maintenance and repair of public highways, roads,
streets, and bridges, and expenses authorized by the state legislature for dissemination
of public information relating to the public highways, roads, streets and bridges of
the state of Montana and the use thereof.
'
47Montana Legislative Council, supra note 2 at 58.
'"Subcommittee, supra note 90 at 4.
..
9MoNT. CONST. art. XII, § 3: All mines and mining claims, both placer and rock in
place, containing or bearing gold, silver, copper, lead, coal or other valuable mineral
deposits, after purchase thereof from the United States, shall be taxed at the price
paid the United States therefor, unless the surface ground, or some part thereof,
of such mine or claim, is used for other than mining purposes, in which case said
surface ground, or any part thereof, so used for other than mining purposes shall be
taxed at its value for such other purposes, as provided by law; and all machinery
used in mining, and all property and surface improvements upon or appurtenant to
mines and mining claims which have a value separate and independent of such mines
or mining claims, and the annual net proceeds of all mines and mining claims shall
be taxed as provided by law.
-Comment, Taxation of Mineral Interests Under Article XII, Section 3 of the Montana
State Constitution, 32 MONT. L, REv. 47 (1971).
mid. at 63.
u"Id. at 63-64.
WMontana Legislative Council, supra note 2 at 58.
'"Subcommittee, supra note 90 at 11.
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recommended that the section be deleted. This is not to say that the
effect is undesirable but only that it is statutory in nature and should,
if desired, be passed as a statute.
Section 4.155 This section restricts the power of the Legislature to
provide assistance to the counties and municipalities of the state. The
only money that the state is permitted to distribute to the local govern-
ment is raised by license taxes,158 although the state did try to assist
some cities in providing parks in 1910.15' A board of park commissioners
was to be established in these cities and the members were to be ap-
pointed by the governor. The board was then to advise the city council
of the amount needed to carry out its function. The court held that if the
state could not raise taxes to give to the cities and towns, neither could
they establish a park board in cities with authority to tell the city
council to raise money to support that board's functions. 158 The court
found that this statute violated not only Article XII, Section 4, but
also the entire theory of local self-government established by the Con-
stitution.159 It is provisions in a Constitution similar in nature to Section
4 that have tied the hands of state government in other states thereby
restricting the aid they can give to the cities. 160 The Montana Legislative
Council determined that this section is adequate,'8 ' while the Subcom-
mittee reserved judgment at the time it made its report.'6 2 Whatever
the convention decides in this area, it must be consistent with the theory
of local government adopted. It is not inconsistent to retain the theory
of local self-government and still allow the legislature some authority
to provide assistance to local governments. If the constitution is silent,
the legislature will have that authority.
Section 5.183 This section purports to insure that the same property
valuation will be used whether it is a state or local tax that is being
m5MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 4: The legislative assembly shall not levy taxes upon the
inhabitants or property in any county, city, town, or municipal corporation for county,
town, or municipal purposes, but it may by law invest in the corporate authorities
thereof powers to assess and collect taxes for such purposes.
'OSubcommittee, supra note 90 at 6.
'Laws of 1901, 73 (R.C.M. 1907 § 3318-3324).
'"State v. Edwards, 42 Mont. 135, 149, 111 P. 734 (1910).
'5id. at 149-150.
'0Subcommittee, supra note 90 at 6. Quoting from, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF
MONTANA, STATE AND LOCAL RELATIONS, STATE AND LOCAL FINANCE (October, 1964)
,at 5: "Montana falls near the bottom of the list in the proportion of local revenue
derived from state sources - 16.3 percent in 1962. Only six states show a smaller
proportion: Alaska (13.6 percent), Hawaii (11.3), Maine (13.7), New Hampshire
(7.0), South Dakota (9.7), and Vermont (12.1). With 90.2 percent of the Montana
total going to education it is obvious that the state is contributing too little to
county and municipal support. The percentage of local government revenues raised
from state grants-in-aid and shared taxes has remained relatively constant (15.8 to
16.3) in the two decades from 1942 to 1962, although the large increases in local
budgets has forced substantial increases in the hard-pressed property tax in the
same period.''
"'Montana Legislative Council, supra note 2 at 58.
"'Subcommittee, supra note 90 at 7.
'OMONT. CONST. art. XII, § 5: Taxes for city, town and school purposes may be levied
on all subjects and objects of taxation, but the assessed valuation of any property
shall not exceed the valuation of the same property for state and county purposes.
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levied. As a practical matter, it would be cumbersome and expensive to
value property at two different rates. It would not be difficult to arrive
at the same result by carefully drafting the article requiring equality
and uniformity of all property taxes if it is decided that such an article
is desirable. This is probably the effect of the article suggested by the
subcommittee.0 4 In any event, a separate section devoted to this propo-
sition is not necessary.
Section 8.165 This section prohibits the taking of private property
for the debts of public corporations. The judiciary has only once been
asked to construe this section. In Edwards v. County of Lewis and
Clark,166 the issue was whether the county could sell coupon bonds of
the county equal to the amount of a $32,077.82 debt owed for road work,
without submitting the question to the electors. However, the statute in
question prohibited the refunding of outstanding indebtedness exceeding
$10,000 without the approval of the voters of the county.167 Since the
legislature had acted, the county could validly incur debts up to $10,000,
but not more. The county commissioners could not exercise greater
power than was given them by statute. The court stated that the only
meaning of the section was that no statute may be enacted
. . . under which private property may be taken to pay the debts
of a public corporation, such as a county or city. Aside from this
limitation the legislature was left free to enact such measures as it
deemed best touching the subject matter under consideration. If
it failed to act at all there is no power other than public opinion
which can coerce it into activity.'
The Legislative Council concluded that this section is adequate.'6 9
The Subcommittee has made recommendations that would broaden the
tax base and allow taxes on personal and business income. 1 70 The Four-
teenth Amendment prohibits the taking of property without due process.
Furthermore, sound budget measures would prohibit this method of
remedial financing. By removing the restrictions on state aid to local
government, such a situation would not likely arise. In any case, guide-
lines and restrictions placed upon the revenue-raising power of cities
and towns are properly the subject of legislative enactments.
'"Subcommittee, supra note 90 at 7. This provision is quoted in textual matter at foot-
note 93.
'
0 MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 8: Private property shall not be taken or sold for the
corporate debts of public corporations, but the legislative assembly may provide by
law for the funding thereof, and shall provide by law for the payment thereof, in-
cluding all funded debts and obligations, by assessment and taxation of all private
property not exempt from taxation within the limits of the territory over which such
corporations respectively have authority.
10853 Mont 359, 165 P. 297 (1917).
16Id. at 368.
161d. at 365.
'"Legislative Council, supra note 2 at 59.
"'Subcommittee, supra note 90 at 8. Proposed Section 8: "Private property shall not
be taken or sold for the corporate debts of public corporations, but the legislative
assembly may provide by law for the funding thereof, and shall provide by law for
the payment thereof, including all funded debts and obligations, by taxation of
personal and business income and/or by assessment taxation of all private property
not exempt from taxation within the limits of the territory over which such corpora-
tions respectively have authority.'
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Section 10.17' This section requires that the funds derived from
tax levies shall be paid into the state treasury and may not be paid out
of the treasury except as provided by law. All four state constitutions
analyzed by this writer have similar sections and so does the Model
State Constitution."72 The Legislative Council in its study of several
constitutions found no state without a similar safeguard written into the
constitution. 173 The Subcommittee discovered that this provision is dupli-
cated in Article V, Section 34.174 However, since other subcommittees
had recommended that that section be deleted and that the limitation
more properly belongs in the Taxation and Revenue Article, the Sub-
committee recommended that Section 10 be retained.17 5 This writer agrees
that a provision at least similar to Section 10 is both appropriate and
desirable.
Section 11.176 Most state constitutions provide that taxes may only
be levied for public purposes. Both the Legislative Counci' 7 7 and the
Subcommittee17 8 have indicated that in their judgment the section is
adequate and a reasonable limitation on the legislature's power. The
judiciary has interpreted this section quite liberally and allowed the
discretion of the legislature to have great weight in determining what
is a public purpose.
Whether a particular purpose is 'public,' as that term is employed
[above], is not always easy of solution. The power of taxation is a
legislative perogative, and therefore, the determination of the ques-
tion whether a particular purpose is or is not one which so intimately
concerns the public as to render taxation permissible is for the
legislature in the first instance."
"nMONT. CONST. art. XII, § 10: All taxes levied for state purposes shall be paid into
the state treasury, and no money shall be drawn from the treasury but in pursuance
of specific appropriations made by law.
"MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION § 7.03. (a) No money shall be withdrawn from the
treasury except in accordance with appropriations made by law, nor shall any obliga-
tion for the payment of money be incurred except as authorized by law. The appro-
priation for each department, office or agency of the state, for which appropriation
is made, shall be for a specific sum of money and no appropriation shall allocate to
any object the proceeds of any particular tax or fund or a part or percentage
thereof, except when required by the federal government for participation in federal
programs.
(b) All state and local expenditures, including salaries paid by the legislative, execu-
tive and judicial branches of government, shall be matters of public record.
1
"Legislative Council, supra note 2 at 59.1 7
'Subcommittee, supra note 90 at 8.171Id.
17"MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 11: Taxes shall be levied and collected by general laws
and for public purposes only. They shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects
within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax.
Discussion of the second sentence of this section was presented in conjunction with
section 1, Equality and Uniformity. The first sentence of the section is being pre-
sented in its numerical order. Concurrence with the Legislative Council and the Sub-
committee concerning section 11 goes only to the first sentence of that section as it is
presently written.
"'Legislative Council, supra note 2 at 59.
'Subcommittee, supra note 90 at 9.
'Lewis and Clark County v. Industrial Accident Board of Montana, 52 Mont. 6, 12,
155 P. 268 (1916).
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In Lewis and Clark County'80 the issue was whether Workman's Compen-
sation was a public purpose. The court, of course, held that it was.
"The mere fact that money raised will go to individuals will not con-
demn the Act in question, since the test is not as to who receives the
money, but, is the purpose for which it is to be expended a public
purpose."''1 This writer concurs with the conclusion of the Legislative
Council and the Subcommittee that this is a reasonable limitation on
the legislature's power, even though the reviewing authority will place
great weight on the legislature's interpretation of public purpose.
Section 12.182 The Subcommittee has succinctly stated the purpose
of this section: "This section prohibits deficit spending during any
fiscal year, except for certain defense expenditures.' 1 3 However, this
section has been held not to bar the raising of revenue for payment of
outstanding and unpaid warrants which resulted from a failure in prior
years of revenue to equal appropriations.8 4 An appropriation is not a
setting apart of general funds for a specific purpose. It is only "the
sanction of law to the expenditure of a definite amount of [such] funds
in the treasury, or which is contemplated will be collected under exist-
ing revenue laws."'1 5 The problem arose during the depression years
and the state was not collecting what it had anticipated it could and
should collect. By paying off the outstanding warrants from prior years
and continuing to operate the state government resulted in an empty
treasury for some of the current expenses. The court stated:
We therefore hold that § 12, Art. XII, has to do only with the relation
of future expenditures to income so far, at least, as the appropria-
tions are made under constitutional mandates and that the appro-
priations are made under constitutional mandates and that the
appropriations made and expenditures authorized, and which resulted
in the registered warrants attacked, did not exceed the total tax
then provided by law and applicable thereto, within the meaning
of that section.'
Whether deficit spending is or is not a sound economic theory should
not be decided by convention delegates. Theories of government finance
should not be locked into the state's basic legal document. It is not
inconceivable that circumstances beyond the control of the state officers
mid.
m8'Stanley v. Jeffries, 86 Mont. 114, 129, 284 P. 134, 70 A.L.R. 166 (1930).
'UMowT. CONST. art. XII, § 12: No appropriation shall be made nor any expenditures
authorized by the legislative assembly whereby the expenditures of the state during
any fiscal year shall exceed the total tax then provided by law, and applicable to such
appropriation or expenditure, unless the legislative assembly making such appropria-
tion shall provide for levying a sufficient tax, not exceeding the rate allowed in Sec-
tion nine (9) of this article, to pay such appropriations or expenditures within such
fiscal year. This provision shall not apply to appropriations or expenditures to suppress
insurrection, defend the state, or assist in defending the United States in time of war.
No appropriation of public moneys shall be made for a longer term than two years.
Subcommittee, supra note 90 at 9.
18State ex rel Tipton v. Erickson, 93 Mont. 466, 19 P.2d 227 (1933).
1id. at 473.
"ld. at 474-75.
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could create a situation in which deficit spending would be necessary
and desirable. Indeed, this is illustrated by State v. Erickson.' 7
The Legislative Council has recommended that this section be re-
tained.188 The Subcommittee revised the section deleting any reference
to Section 9 which the Subcommittee has suggested repealing.8 9 Con-
trary to those recommendations, this writer believes that it should be
within the discretion of the legislature to determine whether or not
deficit spending is a proper economic alternative under a given set of
circumstances.
Section 13.190 This section sets forth the details concerning admini-
strative matters dealing with the duties of the state treasurer and the
responsibilities of the governor. No other constitution analyzed has
similar measures. Both the Legislative Council' 9' and the Subcommit-
tee1 2 concluded that this section was statutory in nature and recom-
mended that it be deleted. This writer agrees with that recommendation.
Section 14.193 This section of the article establishes a state de-
pository board made up of the governor, state auditor and state treas-
urer. It is statutory in nature. The Legislative Council recommended
deletion,'9 4 but the Subcommittee failed to comment upon it in its
report. It should, indeed, be deleted, thereby allowing the Legislature
to provide for a depository or board as it sees fit.
1'State v. Erickson, supra note 184.
' Legislative Council, supra note 2 at 60.
"'Subcommittee, supra note 90 at 9.
"'MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 13: The state treasurer shall keep a separate account of
each fund in his hands, and shall at the end of each quarter of the fiscal year report
to the governor in writing, under oath, the amount of all moneys in his hands to
the credit of every such fund, and the place or places where the same is kept or
deposited, and the number and amount of every warrant paid or redeemed by him
during the quarter. The governor, or other person or persons authorized by law,
shall verify said report and cause the same to be immediately published in at least
one newspaper printed at the seat of government, and otherwise as the legislative
assembly may require. The legislative assembly may provide by law further regu-
lations for the safe keeping and management of the public funds in the hands of
the treasurer; but notwithstanding any such regulations, the treasurer and his
sureties shall in all cases be held responsible therefor.
"Legislative Council, supra note 2 at 60.
11'Subcommittee, supra note 90 at 11.
"'MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 14: The governor, state auditor and state treasurer are
hereby constituted a state depository board with full power and authority to designate
depositories with which all funds in the hands of the state treasurer shall be deposited,
and at such rate of interest as may be prescribed by law. When money shall have
been deposited under direction of said depository board and in accordance with the
law, the treasurer shall not be liable for loss on account of any such deposit occurring
through damage by the elements or for any other cause or reason occasioned through
means other than his own neglect, fraud or dishonorable conduct. The making of
profit out of public moneys, or using the same for any purpose not authorized by
law, by the state treasurer or by any other public officer, shall be deemed a felony,
and shall be punished as provided for by laws and part of such punishment shall
be disqualification to hold any public office.
"'Legislative Council, supra note 2 at 60.
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Section 15.195 This section establishes and governs the actions of
the State Board of Equalization. Numerous cases have been decided
by the Montana Court defining the powers and duties of the Board.
The Legislative Council has recommended its deletion. 196 The comments
of the Subcommittee are of particular interest.
This section is statutory; it has been amended twice, with many
more amendments proposed .... All [of these] studies have indicated
administrative weakness in the present constitutional method of
administrative organizations for property taxation.
The deletion of this section from Article XII would allow the legis-
lature to establish by law an improved method of property tax
administration. Presently, this would require a constitutional amend-
ment. The State Board of Equalization, in testimony before the
Legislative Council in 1964 agreed there was merit in removing
the constitutional status of the board.'
The Subcommittee concurred with the Legislative Council's recommen-
dation.198 No other constitution analyzed by this writer has a provision
even remotely similar to this section. The legislature should have much
needed flexibility in this area if a sound fiscal policy is to be established.
"95MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 15: The board of county commissioners of each county
shall constitute the county board of equalization. The duties of such board shall be
to adjust and equalize the valuation of taxable property within their respective
counties, and all such adjustments and equalizations may be supervised, reviewed,
changed, increased or decreased by the state board of equalization. The state board
of equalization shall be composed of three members who shall be appointed by the
governor by and with the advice and consent of the senate. A majority of the mem-
bers of the state board of equalization shall constitute a quorum. The term of office
of one of the members first appointed shall end on March 1st, 1925, of another
first appointed on March 1st, 1927, and of the third first appointed on March 1st,
1929. Each succeeding member shall hold his office for the term of six years, and
until his successors shall have been appointed and qualified. In case of a vacancy
the person appointed to fill such vacancy shall hold office for the unexpired term
in which the vacancy occurs. The qualifications and salaries of the members of
the state board of equalization shall be as provided by law, provided, however, that
such members shall be so selected that the board will not be composed of more than
two persons who are affiliated with the same political party or organization; pro-
vided, further, that each member shall devote his entire time to the duties of the
office and shall not hold any position of trust or profit, or engage in any occupa-
tion or business interfering or inconsistent with his duties as a member of such
board, or serve on or under any committee of any political party or organization,
or take part, either directly or indirectly, in any political campaign in the interest
of any political party or organization or candidate for office. The state board of
equalization shall adjust and equalize the valuation of taxable property among the
several counties, and the different classes of taxable property in any county and in
the several counties and between individual taxpayers; supervise and review the
acts of the county assessors and county boards of equalization; change, increase,
or decrease valuations made by county assessors or equalized by the county boards
of equalization; and exercise such authority and do all things necessary to secure
a fair, just and equitable valuation of all taxable property among counties between
the different classes of property, and between individual taxpayers. Said state board
of equalization shall also have such other powers, and perform such other duties
relating to taxation as may be prescribed by law.
"OLegislative Council, supra note 2 at 61.
"'Subcommittee, supra note 90 at 13.
usId. at 14.
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Section 16.'19 This section requires that there be statutes to pre-
scribe the manner in which assessment is to be accomplished. If the
provision said no more, there would be no compelling reason to change
it. However, since it requires that certain taxes must be apportioned
to local government, it impedes legislative discretion. Furthermore, it
is complicated and expensive to administer a law which dictates appor-
tionment in such a manner.
Three of the four state constitutions analyzed by this writer require
that the legislature provide for assessment standards. Whether the
standard should be true cash value or a percentage thereof is not per-
tinent to the convention. The legislature should be permitted to decide
the standard. "The method of tax determination, assessment, and col-
lection should be, wherever possible, left to legislative enactment, since
improved practices and techniques should be available. ' 200  Although
the Legislative Council 201 proposed that the section be amended to delete
reference to the State Board, the Subcommittee recommended that the
provision be amended to read "all property shall be assessed in the man-
ner prescribed by law. '20 2 This writer concurs with the Subcommittee's
recommendation.
Section 17.203 This section of Article XII purports to define all
property subject to taxation. When construed with Section 2 it deter-
mines the extent to which the legislature may exempt property.
20 4
It is totally unnecessary to define the property to be taxed, and much
more reasonable to simply declare what property may not be taxed,
thereby leaving it to the legislature to make its own determinations.
No other constitution analyzed by this writer contains a similar provi-
sion. The Subcommittee also realized this provision to be a limitation
on the legislature's power but was "not prepared to judge its ade-
quacy. '205 The Legislative Council concluded the section was adequate. 2 6
This writer has concluded that it is a meaningless measure and that it
should be removed from the Constitution.
"MONT. CONST. art XII, § 16: All property shall be assessed in the manner prescribed
by law except as is otherwise provided in this constitution. The franchise, roadway,
roadbed, rails and rolling stock of all railroads operated in more than one county
in this state shall be assessed by the state board of equalization and the same shall
be apportioned to the counties, cities, towns, townships and school districts in which
such railroads are located, in proportion to the number of miles of railway laid in
such counties, cities, towns, townships and school districts.
mSubcommittee, supra note 90 at 10.
2DLegislative Council, supra note 2 at 61.
12Subcommittee, supra note 90 at 9.
MMONT. CoNsT. art. XII, § 17: The word property as used in this article is hereby
declared to include moneys, credits, bonds, stocks, franchises and all matters and
things (real, personal and mixed) capable of private ownership, but this shall not
be construed so as to authorize the taxation of the stock of any company or corpora-
tion when the property of such stocks is within the state and has been taxed.
0Hilger v. Moore, supra note 13 at 169.
2Subcommittee, supra note 90 at 10.
6Legislative Council, supra note 2 at 61.
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Section 18.207 This section is a "general grant of legislative author-
ity. '20 8  Since the legislature already has inherent power unless re-
strained by the state constitution or the federal constitution, this section
is superfluous. This writer concurs with both the Legislative Council2 9
and the Subcommittee that the section should be deleted.
210
CONCLUSION
It is probably a safe assumption that the people of Montana do not
want to become totally reliant on the federal government to provide the
services, necessities and conveniences of modern life. Therefore, a need
exists to provide for these items at the state and local level. The
foundation for such self-help may now be created by the drafting of a
simple, flexible, and modern revenue provision for the Constitution.
"Although brevity itself is no guarantee of a good constitution, it is
usually associated with the clarity and flexibility important in basic
law."'2 11 There are authorities who recommend that a state constitution
should have no article at all on taxation, thus allowing the legislature
and governor the utmost in flexibility.212 Practically speaking, it is
doubtful that the voters would ratify a Constitution that left all taxa-
tion and finance power unchecked.
What should a state constitution contain? One point must be made
clear. The convention must not become concerned with the tax struc-
ture per se, the arguments for or against the various taxes or the
theories of property tax assessment. The constitution is to provide for
sound policies, not theories and procedures. The best answer to the
question in this writer's opinion was provided in the Subcommittee's
report:
In its simplest form, the problem of what to include in the article
on taxation and finance is a test of one's belief in our system of
representative democracy. It is difficult to reconcile a position de-
manding a series of constitutional prohibitions or limitations upon
the legislature's exercise of discretion in respect to taxation and
finance with a real belief in democracy. Those who argue for con-
stitutional checks are admitting a lack of belief in the capacity or
desire of the elected representatives of the voters to establish and
maintain an adequate and equitable system of financing public
expenditures.'
A more poignant observation is hard to imagine. With those comments
in mind the following proposal is presented as a viable alternative to
the present article on Revenue and Taxation.
MMONT. CONST. art. XII, § 18: The legislative assembly shall pass all laws necessary
to carry out the provisions of this article.
mSubcommittee, upra note 90 at 14.
"Legislative Council, supra note 2 at 61.
mOSubcommittee, supra note 90 at 14.
"League of Women Voters, supra note 4 at 3.
a2Id. at 28 citing MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION at 91 (6th ed. 1968).
"'Subcommittee, supra note 90 quoting Kresky, SALIENT ISSUES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
REvISION at 136-37 (1961).
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§ 1: The power of taxation shall never be surrendered, suspended
or contracted away.
§ 2: Standards for appraisal of all property assessed by the State
or its political subdivisions shall be prescribed by law.
§ 3: Taxes shall be levied and collected by general laws and for
public purposes only.
§ 4: All taxes levied for state purposes shall be paid into the
treasury, and no money shall be drawn therefrom but in pur-
suance of specific appropriations made by law.
§ 5: Exemptions from taxation may be granted only by general
laws. Unless otherwise provided by law, all exemptions from
taxation may be altered or repealed, except those exempting
real and personal property used exclusively for religious,
educational, charitable or cemetery purposes, as defined by
law, and owned by any corporation or association organized
and conducted exclusively for one or more of such purposes
and not operating for profit.
This proposed provision has several advantages. It is devoid of
any special interest influence. The revenue system under such an article
could be planned in terms of the total state and local situation. There
is no earmarking of any funds which inhibits budgetary planning. It
would not tie the hands of the legislators in providing for capable, effi-
cient and honest administration. The proposal would not be a document
by which the convention delegates would rule the state from their
graves or under which the judiciary would be required to establish
state policy.
A taxation and finance article composed of these five sections would
provide a sound basis upon which the elected representatives could
respond to the wishes of the people of Montana.
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